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Abstract 
 
This article examines the relationship between the form of fiscal decentralization in Spain 
and the rise in tensions between the Spanish and Catalan governments during the financial 
crisis, in particular from mid 2010 to mid 2013. As a profound budgetary crisis unfolded at 
regional government level in Spain, longstanding disputes over the regional financing system 
and its methods of redistribution among the seventeen autonomous communities escalated. 
Most notably, Catalonia, one of the most indebted regions, attributed its financial woes in 
part to over-redistribution. This is not a straightforward connection, but the lack of clarity 
regarding both the workings of the regional financing system and the causes of the regions’ 
varying levels of fiscal (in)compliance reduced accountability and fuelled disputes among 
central and regional governments, giving both sides scope to offer different interpretations. 
The smoke and mirrors regarding regional finances combined with the nature of 
intergovernmental dynamics in Spain contribute to explaining the persistent inability to 
resolve regional fiscal problems and agree a long-lasting reform of the regional financing 
system.  
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Introduction 
  
           Since the approval of the Constitution of 1978, Spain has transferred extensive policy 
competences to its seventeen autonomous communities (hereafter regions) and become one 
of the most decentralized countries in Europe. While the transfer of spending competences 
has been accompanied to some degree by a transfer of revenue-raising powers, the former 
outweighs the latter in all but the two regions with near fiscal autonomy (the Basque Country 
and Navarre), hence most also depend on revenue transfers from the central government to 
carry out the policy competences assigned to them. Moreover, the existence of two different 
regional financing models (the charter regime for the two afore-mentioned regions versus the 
common regime for the remaining fifteen) has frequently caused division.  
           The aim here is to analyse how longstanding controversies over the regional financing 
system have been exacerbated during the economic crisis and how this has interacted with the 
clash between the pro-sovereignty drive in Catalonia and a centralising Spanish government. 
As the crisis took hold in 2008, Spain’s regional governments were endowed with the 
potentially dangerous mix of relatively limited tax autonomy but significant expenditure and 
borrowing autonomy – a form of fiscal decentralization which generates an accountability 
gap, risks fiscal indiscipline among subnational governments and creates expectations that the 
central government will bail them out if necessary (Rodden 2006). As their debt levels 
rapidly grew, the central government attributed part of the responsibility for Spain’s 
budgetary crisis to the country’s regional governments. This caused endless controversy, 
which was intensified by the longstanding debate over the flaws of the redistribution system. 
The fifteen regions under the common financing regime participate in an equalization 
mechanism, but it proves overly redistributive in some cases, while the two regions under the 
charter regime – which are among the richest in Spain in GDP per capita terms – are exempt 
from contributing to it. Dissatisfaction with this situation grew amid the increased fight for 
resources. Most notably, the nationalist government of Catalonia, one of the most indebted 
regions, repeatedly attributed its financial woes in part to over-redistribution.  
             Economists have analyzed at length both the nature of regional fiscal indiscipline in 
Spain and the flaws of the equalization mechanism (e.g. De la Fuente 2013a and 2012a, 
respectively). Yet there has been relatively little analysis of the politics of the perceived 
interrelationship between these two dimensions throughout the crisis beyond basic 
acknowledgement of Catalonia’s dissatisfaction. This paper seeks to investigate the political 
uses and abuses of this alleged interrelationship focusing on the period from mid 2010 to mid 
2013. Particular attention will be paid to Catalonia as the protagonist in the regional financing 
disputes and the main antagonist of central government in this regard, though due 
consideration will also be given to the broader inter-regional dynamics of the debate, which 
impact Spanish-Catalan bilateral relations. 
           I do not intend to suggest a straightforward connection between the level of fiscal 
(in)discipline of the regions and their respective treatment by the regional financing system, 
or to investigate the exact degree to which such a connection exists. This is inherently 
ambiguous, and other factors which have contributed to explaining differences in the regions’ 
fiscal performance have been studied elsewhere, such as variations in the behaviour of 
regional revenues and expenditure throughout the crisis (see Leal Marcos and López Laborda 
2013). My purpose is, rather, to address the following questions: How did politicians make 
use of such smoke and mirrors surrounding regional finances for partisan and instrumental 
motives during the period concerned? What political, economic and market conditions shaped 
their arguments? What were the consequences of this for Spanish-Catalan government 
relations, within the context of broader intergovernmental relations in Spain? And how does 
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this relate to the continued inability to reach a satisfactory solution to the problems with the 
regional financing system?  
           This article maintains that the complexity of the regional financing system has 
provided a cover for sustaining different political viewpoints on regional fiscal and financial 
behaviour. This has exacerbated intergovernmental tensions and threatens to problematize the 
next reform of the common financing regime, a process which the Spanish government is due 
to undertake in the near future, starting in the second half of 2014 at the earliest.1 In this 
sense, the paper aims to build on previous studies of the role of political factors in the 
persistent instability of the regional financing system in Spain (e.g. León 2009). It also hopes 
to contribute to the wider political economy literature (e.g. Rodden 2006) on the risks and 
pitfalls that politics poses to the expected improvements in efficiency, accountability and 
fiscal discipline often predicted by theorists of federal and decentralized fiscal models.   
           The article will begin with an overview first of the regional financing system and then 
of the regional debt crisis, considering the relationship between the two dimensions 
maintained by Catalonia. It will follow with an analysis of the political, economic and market 
conditions that shaped the evolution of the regions’ fiscal performance and financing debates 
and impacted Spanish-Catalan relations from mid 2010 to mid 2013. The period of socialist 
(Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) central government until November 2011 will be 
contrasted here with the period of conservative (Partido Popular, PP) central government 
thereafter. A final section contemplates future prospects.    
 
The regional financing system 
 
          Articles 156 to 158 of the Spanish Constitution outline the basic principles of the 
regional financing system, which in the strictest sense is designed to ensure the regions have 
sufficient revenues to provide a minimum level of public services. Separately from the 
regional financing system per se, an Inter-territorial Compensation Fund implements the 
principle of territorial solidarity by promoting development in less prosperous regions in 
order ultimately to achieve income redistribution – a purpose also served by European 
structural and cohesion funds to Spain particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s (see, for 
example, Álvarez et al. 2004). A degree of overlap and indeed confusion between these two 
elements (service provision and solidarity) nevertheless results since the present regional 
financing system for services incorporates an equalisation mechanism to redistribute tax 
revenues among the regions, as well as a Cooperation Fund (see below) which fulfils a 
similar purpose to the Inter-territorial Compensation Fund (on this, see Fernández Llera and 
Delgado Rivero 2010). Controversy arises in particular over the nature of the equalisation 
mechanism due to the different ways in which the regional financing models treat the regions, 
as follows: 
 
Charter regime 
  
           Two of Spain’s seventeen regions, the Basque Country and Navarre, have a specific 
financing system (régimen foral, from fuero or medieval charter) which grants them fiscal 
autonomy. This arrangement was either retained by or restored to them during the Transition 
in recognition of the long tradition in this regard in their provinces (see Colino 2012: 3-5). 
Under the agreement known as the concierto in the Basque Country and the convenio in 
Navarre, the provincial authorities legislate and levy almost all their own taxes and then pay 
an annual quota (cupo or aportación, respectively) to the central government towards those 
competences that remain exclusively the responsibility of the Spanish state (e.g. foreign and 
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defence policy). In the Basque case, the cupo covers 6.24% of these general expenses, 
broadly in line with the region’s share of Spain’s GDP.   
           The Basque and Navarrese economic agreements enjoy cross-party support within 
their regions and are upheld by the main Spanish statewide parties, but a number of 
economists and political scientists (e.g. De la Fuente 2012b, Colino 2012) have criticised the 
system while Catalan nationalist politicians have often requested a similar model in recent 
times. Academic criticism is not so much of the concept of fiscal autonomy per se, which is 
acknowledged to bring some benefits such as increased accountability (compared to revenue-
sharing arrangements), but rather of how it is applied in the Basque Country and Navarre 
since it exempts the two regions from contributing to the equalization mechanism in the 
common financing regime. They only make a much smaller contribution to inter-regional 
wealth redistribution via the Inter-territorial Compensation Fund. Estimates based on 2007 
data suggest that this exemption reduces the Basque Country’s contribution to the state 
coffers by around EUR 1.79bn per year. Other anomalies in the model lead to further savings 
for the region, thus bringing average per capita financing in the region overall to at least 60% 
higher than the average of the 15 regions under the common regime (De la Fuente 2012b: 4-
5). This situation is generally only considered sustainable for Spain since it applies to two 
relatively small regions which together account for around 8% of the country’s GDP, while it 
would not be exportable to a region the size of Catalonia, which contributes approximately 
18%. 
 
Common regime 
  
           The remaining fifteen of Spain’s regions conform to the common financing regime 
(régimen común) whereby they obtain resources from two main revenue sources: (1) specific 
taxes which are fully or partially ceded to the regions and (2) a central government 
contribution derived from non-ceded tax revenues. The model was first regulated by the 1980 
regional financing law (Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas, 
LOFCA) and was subject to five-yearly revisions from 1986 until 2001, before the latest 
reform took place in 2009 (Bosch and Durán 2008, Borraz and Cantalapiedra 2010, 
Blöchlinger and Vammalle 2012). Over time the share of taxes ceded to the regions has 
gradually increased (along with their legislative and administrative powers over these taxes), 
leading to a proportional reduction in the central government contribution.2  
           A key feature of the model is an equalization mechanism to redistribute wealth. Since 
2009, the majority of the resources within the system have been pooled into what is known as 
the Guarantee Fund for Fundamental Public Services (Fondo de Garantía de Servicios 
Públicos Fundamentales). This money has been distributed among the regions to ensure that 
they each have the same proportional level of resources to provide education, health and 
social services to their citizens. These needs are determined according to each region’s 
‘adjusted population’, calculated via a formula to take into account various demographic and 
geographic weightings. In addition, a much smaller Global Sufficiency Fund (Fondo de 
Suficiencia Global) is designed to ensure the regions have sufficient resources for the 
remainder of their devolved competences (i.e. beyond the essential services) and are net 
winners with the change of model in 2009. Finally, less than 5% of resources in the system 
are designated as two regional convergence funds. These are the Competitiveness and 
Cooperation Funds. The first (Fondo de Competitividad) compensates the usually richer 
regions with typically higher population growth (e.g. Catalonia and Madrid) if the outturn 
figures go against them, in an attempt to reduce the anomaly whereby their financing had 
often ended up below average under the previous model. The second (Fondo de 
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Cooperación) is aimed at increasing resources in the poorer regions with lower per capita 
incomes and/or negative population dynamics (ageing or declining populations).  
           The common financing model was given a very complex design under the 2009 reform 
in order to straddle the demands of different regions, and the central government promised an 
increase in its own contribution to help achieve consensus (Blöchlinger and Vammalle 2012). 
Nevertheless, progress towards solving the longstanding problem of the arbitrary effects of 
the equalization mechanism has proved limited (De la Fuente 2012a, 2012c and 2013c). This 
should ideally bring each region as close as possible to the mean in terms of level of 
financing per adjusted capita but it still proves either overly or insufficiently redistributive in 
some cases. This flaw has persisted over the years largely because all the regions have always 
fought to ensure their respective status quo would be maintained or improve with each 
reform, and the central government has repeatedly obliged since it would be politically costly 
for it to do otherwise (León 2009, De La Fuente 2012a).  
           The new system was implemented in 2009 with some one-off effects specific to that 
year only which gave the impression of a significantly improved equalization mechanism, but 
much of that apparent progress was reversed from the first year of full implementation in 
2010 onwards (see De la Fuente 2012a, chapter 4). Central government transfers of the funds 
due to the regions (known as entregas a cuenta) are made throughout the relevant year based 
on initial revenue estimates, before being revised when the outturn revenue figures are 
confirmed and the regional financing system is liquidated 18 months after year-end. Thus it 
was not until mid 2012 that the full impact of the new model applied in 2010 came to light.3 
The results show that the regions of Madrid and Catalonia, for example, remained among the 
top three contributors to the common financing model in terms of per capita tax revenues, 
with their respective contributions reaching 48% and 23% above the mean in 2010 (see Table 
1). Yet they both ended up ranked below average for the 15 regions in 2010 in terms of total 
financing per adjusted capita post-equalization. This is broadly similar to their position in 
2007 (and beforehand), the final year under the 2001 model for which official figures were 
available when the 2009 model was devised (see De La Fuente 2012a).  
           In contrast, some of the regions that benefitted disproportionately from the 2001 model 
continued to do so. Extremadura, for example, one of the lowest tax revenue contributors per 
capita, maintained its third position out of the 15 regions post-equalization in 2010. 
Meanwhile, since the system is inconsistent and not overly redistributive in all cases, some of 
the relatively richer regions in per capita tax revenues remained relatively richer post-
equalization (e.g. Cantabria and La Rioja) and some of the relatively poorer ones ended up 
equally poor or poorer still (e.g. Valencia, Murcia, Andalusia and Castilla-La Mancha). 
Similarly disparate outcomes emerged again in the liquidation statement of the 2011 regional 
financing system more recently published in July 2013 (Pellicer 2013). These longstanding 
flaws in the equalization mechanism, and the exemption of the Basque Country and Navarre 
from contributing to it, have created ample fuel for political divisions between the regional 
and central governments over the years, with Catalonia voicing the most grievances.  
              Beyond the debates over redistribution, the fight for resources during the crisis also 
unleashed tensions regarding the payment schedule for the Competitiveness Fund. Unlike the 
entregas a cuenta which are provisionally paid during the relevant year and later revised 
when the regional financing system is liquidated, the Competitiveness Fund was set up in 
2009 such that payments from it were not due to be made until the liquidation date. This 
became subject to dispute in 2011 when the regions expecting to benefit from the Fund – 
Catalonia, the Balearics and Madrid, among others – argued that approximate payments 
should be made in that same year and they should not be forced to make additional cuts to 
compensate for this. At that time Catalonia estimated its share of the Fund for 2011 at EUR 
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1.45bn, which the central government disputed. Ultimately the region received EUR 835m in 
July 2013 once the outturn revenue figures had been confirmed.  
           Such discrepancies between initial estimates and final outturn figures were 
characteristic of the common financing model in general in the depths of the financial crisis. 
Although several regions asked for payments from the Competitiveness Fund for 2011 to be 
made that same year, most were still indebted to the central government at the time to varying 
degrees for windfall gains received in 2008 and especially 2009. In those years, the initial 
revenue projections on which the central government transfers to the regions were based were 
much greater than the final outturn revenue figures, since the government had not anticipated 
the extent of the effect of the crisis. Overall the regional governments were due to repay the 
central government in 2010 and 2011 for total windfall gains of EUR 5.514bn received in 
2008 and a particularly substantial EUR 18.736bn in 2009 (in contrast, the liquidations of the 
2010 and 2011 financing systems went in the regions’ favour, showing the central 
government owed them EUR 5.102bn and EUR 4.358bn, respectively). Ultimately, due to the 
regions’ inability to repay these windfall gains in full in 2010 and 2011, a repayment 
schedule was set up over a ten-year period. Such complexities over who is owed what and 
when gave politicians ample room to mention or omit particular versions of figures for 
reasons of political opportunism.  
 
Regional indebtedness (and its relationship to the regional financing models) 
              
           Concerns over the fiscal indiscipline of many of Spain’s regions throughout the crisis 
amplified tensions over the regional financing system. At the start of the crisis, Spain’s total 
public sector debt as a percentage of GDP was among the lowest levels in Europe but it 
rapidly grew: total government debt (which comprises that of the central government, the 
regional governments, the local authorities and the social security system) rose from 36.3% 
of GDP at the end of 2007 to 93.4% in the third quarter of 2013,4 when the Spanish 
government acknowledged the figure was set to reach 100% of GDP by the end of 2014. 
Borrowing by the regional governments in particular ballooned at an unsustainable rate. Prior 
to the crisis, the total debt held by the 17 regions as a percentage of GDP had hovered 
consistently just above 6% (varying between 6.0% and 6.4%) between 2000 and 2006 before 
declining to 5.8% in 2007. These figures were not surprisingly very low, given that Spain’s 
regional governments had only been in existence since the early 1980s. Low interest rates 
following Spain’s entry to the euro, combined with the availability of European structural 
funding and the cyclically elastic nature of regional tax revenues (Von Hagen and Foremny 
2013: 24), had encouraged a rapid growth in real expenditure during the years of the 
construction boom, for which windfall revenues compensated. When the crisis hit, however, 
regional debt doubled both as a percentage of GDP and in absolute terms in only three years, 
increasing from 5.8% (EUR 61.0bn) at the end of 2007 to 11.6% (EUR 120.8bn) at the end of 
2010. By the end of the third quarter of 2013 it had reached 19.3% of GDP (EUR 197.0bn). 
Valencia and Catalonia stood out as the first and third most indebted regions in terms of debt 
as a percentage of GDP at 29.8% and 27.2% respectively (and also the second and first in 
absolute terms with EUR 29.6bn and EUR 53.7bn). At the opposite end of the spectrum,  
Madrid had the lowest level of debt as a percentage of GDP at 12.0%. These debt figures 
were exclusive of billions of euros accumulated throughout the crisis in unpaid bills to 
suppliers and service providers, particularly in the most indebted regions. By the end of 2011, 
before the central government intervened to provide loans for repayment, these were 
estimated to have reached as much as EUR 30bn. 
           Concerns grew over regional finances in particular since the spirit of austerity was late 
in filtering through to the regions. Although the regions had started to suffer the fall in tax 
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revenues in 2008, the reaction to adjust expenditure accordingly did not begin until 2010 
(Leal Marcos and López Laborda 2013: 34). The regions faced a tougher task than the central 
government to trim their budgets: they manage around one third of state expenditure but 
around two thirds of this amount goes towards the fundamental policy areas of health, 
education and social services. These were far harder to control demand for and cut than areas 
being slashed by the central government, such as public investment in infrastructure, civil 
servants’ salaries and the foreign office budget. Moreover, regional tax revenues from the 
ceded taxes, which had been increased under the 2009 financing system, suffered a greater 
fall as a result of the crisis than the transfers derived from non-ceded taxes, which had 
decreased (Leal Marcos and López Laborda: 30). Still, several regional governments also 
showed reluctance to cut back on expenditure in more feasible areas, and in 2010 there were 
concerns this would persist in the months leading up to regional elections scheduled to be 
held in many of the regions in May 2011.  
           In broad terms, a number of the regions which struggled particularly with fiscal 
discipline (and therefore also tended to lose their appeal to lenders and investors) coincided 
with those penalised by the equalization mechanism in the common financing regime. This 
was especially true of Catalonia, Valencia, Andalusia, the Balearics, Murcia and Castilla-La 
Mancha. These six regions all either experience a significant drop in their level of resources 
per capita between pre- and post-equalization and/or end up in the bottom half of the ranking 
of regions in terms of resources per capita post-equalization (see Table 1). This has been 
exacerbated by the fact that the first three are also among the four largest regions in Spain in 
terms of population size (the other being the Madrid region). This gives them particularly 
high spending needs to cover following the decentralisation of fundamental policy areas, for 
which it became difficult to obtain sufficient financing during the crisis, especially given the 
regions’ relatively limited experience and investor base in this regard. This situation fuelled 
the long-standing controversy over the alleged injustices of the regional financing models, 
with Catalonia heading the debate.  
            Nevertheless, as mentioned in the introduction, the link between financing regimes 
and regional indebtedness has not been so straightforward. Many other factors – including 
regional variations in revenue and expenditure behaviour, (mis)management of finances and 
corruption, and levels of infrastructure investment from the central government – are deemed 
to have played a significant role in determining the indebtedness of each region. The 
comparison between Catalonia and Madrid is eloquent in this regard. Both are among the 
largest regions in Spain in terms of population size and the richest regions in terms of GDP 
and fiscal capacity per capita, and both suffer from the overly redistributive nature of the 
common regime financing system – indeed, the Madrid region is more penalised than 
Catalonia. Yet Catalonia has ended up far more in debt than Madrid and they became poles 
apart in terms of fiscal discipline and their appeal to investors during the crisis. Catalan 
politicians have often argued that as the capital Madrid has benefitted from factors such as 
increased infrastructure spending and other investments, while Catalonia itself has been 
accused of poorer financial management, but the complexity of the situation has created 
confusion as to what factors exactly have caused the discrepancy in fiscal discipline between 
the two regions. The convoluted nature of the regional financing system in itself creates an 
accountability gap, in particular in terms of its complicated division of revenue and 
expenditure responsibilities which is little understood by the general public (Bosch and Durán 
2008: 15). Yet this was exacerbated further during the crisis by the opaqueness of the causes 
of the regions’ varying levels of budgetary compliance and the degree to which these relate or 
not to the financing models – all of which served as fuel for disputes between the central and 
Catalan governments in particular, giving them scope to offer different figures and 
interpretations to pass the buck. The following sections consider the evolution of this 
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situation over the period mid 2010 to mid 2013 under first the PSOE and subsequently the PP 
central governments.  
 
Regional finances under the PSOE minority central government5 
 
           By mid 2010 concerns from Europe were growing about the threat that regional 
finances in Spain posed to the country’s overall financial health and debt sustainability.6 In 
this context, the central government first began to attempt a crackdown on regional 
government spending and borrowing in the second half of 2010 as the rapid growth in 
regional debt made it the main obstacle to Spain’s deficit-reduction targets. The then PSOE 
government had set a year-end deficit target of 2.4% for the seventeen regional governments 
as part of an overall deficit target of 9.3% for general government. Nevertheless, attempts to 
instil fiscal discipline in the regions from 2010 until the end of the Socialist government’s 
time in power in late 2011 were seriously hindered by political considerations in particular, 
especially since the minority central government relied on the support of regionally-based 
parties in parliament and sought to avoid imposing measures on the regions without 
achieving a consensual agreement. 
           The first step the central government took in 2010 was to begin to exercise its right to 
ban fiscally non-compliant regions from issuing new debt. Since Article 156 of the 
Constitution gave the regions the authority to design their own budgetary policies, the central 
government was not authorized to impose a budgetary ceiling on them and the stamp of 
approval for debt issuances was therefore the only significant lever it had on the finances of 
the fifteen regions under the common regime at the time. At a meeting of the Fiscal and 
Financial Policy Council (Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera or CPFF, the 
intergovernmental body that brings together the regional and central finance ministers) in 
November 2010, Economy Minister Elena Salgado announced that Castilla-La Mancha and 
Murcia were the only regions not on track to meet the year-end target deficit target of 2.4% of 
GDP and the government had already exercised its right to ban the two regions from issuing 
debt until they could present a credible plan for financial readjustment. Moreover, all of the 
regions’ ability to issue debt was to become conditional on their meeting of deficit reduction 
targets on a half-yearly basis and plans (originally due to start in 2011) were brought forward 
for the regions to unveil their budgetary positions on a quarterly basis as part of a 
‘transparency exercise’ designed to restore investors’ confidence in Spain. In accordance with 
the new rules, the regions’ deficits for the third quarter of 2010 were publically released for 
the first time in December 2010. These seemed to confirm that only Castilla-La Mancha and 
Murcia were not on track and their fiscal indiscipline would be compensated for by the 
stronger performance of the remaining regions, with a combined regional deficit for the 17 
regions of 1.24% of GDP as of the third quarter of 2012.  
           The ability to limit regional debt issuances is a powerful tool, but political 
considerations would deter Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero from using it. This 
became apparent after significant revisions to several of the regions’ deficit figures revealed 
the majority had failed to meet the 2010 target, bringing their combined deficit at year-end to 
2.83% of GDP.7 The new Catalan government in power since November 2010 was the first to 
reveal a substantially higher 2010 year-end regional deficit estimate in January 2011 than for 
the third quarter (1.71% of GDP), with the final figure presented in March that year coming 
in at 3.86%. In this context, Prime Minister Zapatero tried to allay international concerns 
about Spain’s regional finances and reiterated in an interview with The Financial Times that 
the central government would use its power to prevent any region that was not complying 
with Spain’s deficit-reduction targets from issuing debt (Mallet and Ford 2011). Before long, 
however, a bilateral bargaining arrangement with Catalan president Artur Mas led Zapatero 
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to backtrack. After a one-on-one meeting with Mas in February, Zapatero promised to give 
the Catalan government authorization to start issuing debt to cover its 2011 financing needs, 
despite the fact that it had exceeded the 2010 deficit target and its 2011 financial 
readjustment plan (required to demonstrate compliance with the year-end regional deficit 
target of 1.3% of GDP) was yet to be approved by the central government. Mas also secured 
a pledge from Zapatero that the central government would pay around EUR 760 million euros 
it owed Catalonia for investments in infrastructure pending since 2008, following an 
agreement Catalonia had previously struck with the central government to receive a share of 
the latter’s investment in infrastructure proportional to the region’s weight in the Spanish 
economy (c.18%). Mas promised in return that Convergència i Unió (CiU) would support the 
minority PSOE central government on key pending economic reforms such as initiatives to 
support SMEs and boost the creation of jobs, and potentially the proposed new law on 
solvency requirements for the Spanish savings banks or cajas de ahorros subject to further 
negotiation.  
             The meeting showed the leverage the Catalan government had over the minority 
central government at the time, following the pattern since the 1990s whereby minority 
central governments in Spain have looked to peripheral nationalist parties for support in 
parliament (see Field 2010, Muro 2010). Nevertheless, the debate would continue throughout 
2011 not least because the nearly EUR 1.9bn of debt which Catalonia was given permission 
to issue later in February was only the first tranche of at least EUR 11bn which the region had 
calculated it needed to cover its commitments in 2011, even assuming a proposed 10% slash 
in spending and the fulfilment of commitments which Catalonia expected from the central 
government. The central government repeatedly tried to hold back from giving the region 
permission to issue more debt until it could provide an adequate financial plan to meet the 
2011 regional deficit target of 1.3% of GDP, while the Catalan government conspicuously 
continued to refuse to commit to the target and predicted a year-end regional deficit of 2.66% 
(i.e. still higher than the 2010 target) when it approved its 2011 budget in June that year. CiU 
continued to attribute the state of Catalan finances to (a) the previous Socialist-led tripartite 
coalition in the region (CiU had only returned to office in November 2010 after seven years 
in opposition); (b) the Socialist central government for allegedly failing to meet some of its 
financial commitments to the region (e.g. infrastructure spending, payment from the 
Competitiveness Fund); and (c) the overly redistributive nature of the common financing 
model.   
           Such tensions over regional finances between the central and regional governments in 
their bilateral relations were exacerbated by the traditionally competitive dynamics among 
the regions (on these dynamics, see Keating and Wilson 2009, Muro 2010). For example, the 
heads of over half of Spain’s regions immediately condemned the prime minister’s decision 
in January 2011 to let the Catalan government issue debt despite the fact it had exceeded the 
2010 deficit target and its 2011 financial readjustment plan had not yet been approved. 
Moreover, Castilla-La Mancha and Murcia both remained banned at the time from issuing 
debt due to their fiscal incompliance. All fifteen regions of the common financing regime 
require central government permission to issue debt in the form of bonds or notes. Long-term 
bank loans can be secured without permission but only if a region shows previous and 
continued compliance with budgetary targets, and in 2011 this applied to only three regions 
(Madrid, Galicia, La Rioja) which had fulfilled the budgetary stability target in 2009 (the last 
year for which official figures were available at the time) by recording a deficit of less than 
0.75% of GDP (Goikoetxea and Cantalapiedra 2011: 74). Zapatero tried to reduce tensions by 
insisting that Catalonia was only being given permission to issue debt for refinancing 
purposes rather than new financing needs, but he soon had to concede defeat again and 
promise to extend this concession to other regions in a similar position too.  
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            Subsequent pledges to crack down on regional spending were similarly watered down 
due to political conditionality. At the European Council in March 2011, under pressure from 
the EU to ensure the sustainability of Spain’s public finances, Zapatero promised to come up 
with Spain’s own equivalent of a German debt brake. He committed to introducing a 
budgetary ceiling limiting spending by the central government to nominal GDP growth to 
avoid a growing structural deficit. Yet he shied away from pressures from both European 
officials and the opposition PP to make this rule binding for the regional governments too, 
preferring instead to seek a consensus within the intergovernmental CPFF on the matter in 
order to respect the regions’ competences in the budgetary sphere. In the end, each region 
was left to decide whether to abide by the rule. It was not until August 2011, once Spanish 
bond yields were reaching unsustainable highs due to investors’ distrust of the country’s 
finances, that Zapatero reluctantly agreed to a pact with the PP to reform Article 135 of the 
Spanish Constitution to oblige all tiers of government in Spain (autonomous communities 
included) to adhere to the budgetary stability principle. Henceforth (with effect from 27 
September 2011) neither the central nor the regional governments would be allowed to incur 
a structural deficit exceeding the margins set by the EU without incurring a penalty (see 
Hernández de Cos 2011).    
           In addition to these bilateral and inter-regional dynamics between the central and 
regional governments, debates over regional finances were complicated further by the 
appropriation of the issue by both the ruling party and opposition in the central government in 
Madrid for partisan motives. The contest between the PP and the PSOE often plays out across 
both central and regional levels, for example when either minority central governments or the 
opposition use the regions where they are in power as a tool to help their agenda at central 
level (see Field 2010, Muro 2010). This was exemplified in the debate over payments from 
the Competitiveness Fund corresponding to 2011 mentioned earlier, among other instances. 
When the PSOE central government refused to pay the Competitiveness Fund payments 
ahead of schedule in the first half of 2011 (rather than upon liquidation of the regional 
financing system in mid 2013), some of the PP-led regional governments (e.g. Valencia) were 
supported by the PP headquarters in Madrid when they threatened to take the matter to court. 
Moreover, the PP voted in favour of a CiU motion in the Spanish parliament in May 2011 
requesting payment of the funds for 2011 in the same year, which was defeated. Yet when the 
PP central government came into power later in the year, the new prime minister Mariano 
Rajoy followed Zapatero in refusing to make the relevant payments in 2011.  
 
Regional financing sources  
 
          The fact that most of the regions – including Catalonia – could still access some forms 
of financing for much of the period of Socialist central government gave them a crucial 
degree of autonomy, even if they needed the central government’s permission to issue debt. 
Nevertheless, securing financing rapidly became harder from the second half of 2010 
onwards, especially for the largest and most indebted regions with the greatest financing 
needs. Indeed, when the central government gave Catalonia permission to issue nearly EUR 
1.9bn of debt in February 2011, the new CiU government struggled at first to find a means to 
do so, experiencing the same difficulties as the previous Socialist-led tripartite coalition in 
Catalonia the year before.  
             Prior to the crisis, Spain’s regional governments had met their financing needs 
primarily via bank loans (most often extended by the cajas de ahorros) and, in the case of the 
largest regions with the greatest needs (e.g. Andalusia, Valencia, Catalonia, Madrid), bonds 
issued on the public debt markets. These were subscribed by both Spanish and international 
institutional investors such as pension and insurance funds, as well as banks for their own 
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portfolios. That was when regional bonds were considered solid investment grade by ratings 
agencies, in line with the rating of Spanish government debt at the time. However, the 
situation rapidly changed over 2010 and 2011 as investors became increasingly aware of the 
perilous state of Spain’s regional finances and ratings agencies drastically downgraded many 
of the regions from strong investment grade to junk or near junk status. Only the relatively 
healthier regions like Madrid and the Basque Country managed to cling onto the lower rungs 
of investment grade status, broadly in line with Spanish government debt. Short-term retail 
bonds at expensive rates, credit lines from domestic banks and private placement notes 
tailored to specific investors became the new norm for many of the regions when the majority 
were almost completely shut out of the wholesale public debt markets from mid 2010. For 
many of these instruments the regions ended up paying at least double (often triple) the rates 
the Spanish Treasury was paying for central government debt of the same duration, even as 
Spanish bond yields rose dramatically too.  
           The difference between the first half of 2010 and the following eighteen months 
clearly reveals the change in funding opportunities. In the first half of 2010, fourteen new 
public bonds had been issued to institutional investors by various Spanish regions (Catalonia, 
the Balearics, the Canaries, Madrid, Andalusia, Valencia, Castilla-La Mancha, Galicia, 
Murcia) to raise a total of almost EUR 7.4bn of new financing. Yet the markets then closed to 
the regions and they did not issue any more new such bonds in the second half of 2010, 
followed by only three new issues (at very high rates) in 2011 in a brief window of 
opportunity in April and May to raise a total of EUR 1.3bn (see Table 2). More than 75% of 
the roughly EUR 30bn financing secured by Spain’s 17 regions throughout 2011 would 
mature in under three years as they struggled to access longer-term financing. Moreover, 
approximately 37% of the financing secured that year was in the form of retail bonds (dubbed 
‘patriotic bonds’) issued to largely unsuspecting individual investors, with the remainder split 
between short-term loans (c.36%), private placement notes (c.17%), new public bond issues 
for institutional investors (c.5%) and taps on existing bonds (c.5%).8 
           Struggling to issue debt to institutional investors, Catalonia was the first region to 
launch retail bonds to individual domestic investors – usually Catalan citizens, thus the name 
‘patriotic bonds’ – in October/November 2010. Its first sale proved a success in the sense that 
demand was high, enabling the Catalan authorities to sell EUR 3bn of one-year paper. Yet the 
rate the Catalan government had to pay was very high – a return of 4.75% plus bank 
commission of 3%, amounting to 7.75% (around triple the rate paid by the Spanish 
government for Treasury bills of the same duration at the time). In the absence of sufficient 
alternative funding sources, the Valencian government decided to jump on the bandwagon, 
following Catalonia by offering EUR 1bn of Valencian ‘patriotic bonds’ at the same rate in 
December. Other struggling regions – the Balearics, Valencia, Andalusia and Murcia – would 
follow suit the following year. These regional governments had little other option, but selling 
these retail bonds to the unsuspecting general public unaware of the full extent of the regions’ 
debt problems was akin to the scandal of the regional cajas de ahorros selling preference 
shares to customers as though they were as safe as deposits (on this, see for example 
Domínguez Martínez 2012). Overall, the regions with the greatest financial difficulties raised 
a total of EUR 15bn via one- and two-year retail bonds from the first issue by Catalonia in 
November 2010 through to the end of 2011 (see Table 3), and several of these subsequently 
had to be refinanced. Tables 2 and 3 show the contrast between 2010 and 2011 as short-term 
retail bonds became far more dominant in the latter year than the usually long-term traditional 
bonds issued to institutional investors, a situation which continued into 2012. The relatively 
healthier Madrid region never had to resort to ‘patriotic bonds’, despite also having large 
financing needs as one of the larger regions, since it continued to manage to secure sufficient 
financing from institutional investors (primarily via private placement notes) as well as loans. 
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Regional finances under the PP majority central government 
 
           By the time the PP government came into power following the general elections held 
on 20 November 2011, the financial predicament of Spain’s most cash-strapped regions had 
deteriorated further. At the end of 2011, the regions significantly over-shot the combined 
regional deficit target of 1.3% of GDP, coming in at 3.31%. This largely contributed to Spain 
overshooting its overall 6% target to reach 8.96%. Yet many of the regions’ access to funding 
had by then almost completely dried up as they were struggling to continue to find demand 
for ‘patriotic bonds’. In any case, they could not afford to keep issuing such expensive 
instruments (the final such issuance would take place in May 2012 – see Table 3). In this 
context, the situation changed substantially throughout 2012 as the new PP central 
government became the holder of the purse strings for several regional governments that 
became reliant upon loans from it. Moreover, it had an absolute majority and could therefore 
toughen its stance towards the regions. Concessions from Zapatero to Mas were now firmly 
in the past. In early 2012 the PP government presented a new Budgetary Stability and 
Financial Sustainability Law (approved on 27 April 2012) to implement the constitutional 
reform of Article 135 pacted with the PSOE in September 2011, but with significantly 
tougher regulations than those the PSOE had conceded to then. For example, the new Law 
established a stricter deficit ceiling than had been envisaged (no structural deficit would be 
allowed after a transition period) and set out the Spanish government’s right to intervene any 
region that failed to comply with the fiscal targets it set, among other measures (see 
Hernández de Cos and Pérez 2013). Since the PP is a more centralist party than the PSOE, its 
critics have argued that the party’s attempts to recentralize powers over regional finances 
(and indeed over local authority finances) have not only corresponded to the economic 
purpose of improving Spain’s budgetary position, but have also been politically motivated.  
           The 17 regions’ total gross financing needs in 2012 totalled around EUR 40bn, with 
Catalonia accounting for over a quarter of this amount. Many could no longer feasibly raise 
funds to meet these needs. Moreover, they had by now also accumulated billions of euros in 
unpaid bills to suppliers, to the extent that the National Association of the Pharmaceutical 
Industry in Spain (Farmaindustria) warned some pharmaceutical companies were starting to 
shy away from supplying medicines in certain Spanish regions. Faced with this situation, 
Spain’s new central government thus took immediate action from January 2012 to avoid the 
immensely damaging repercussions for Spain of a potential regional government default. 
Since it had relatively greater access to financing than the regions (and at lower rates), it 
secured funds to make loans guaranteed by the Spanish Treasury to the regions as follows: 
1)  In January 2012 the government set up a EUR 10bn credit line (extendible to EUR 
15bn) from the Official Credit Institute (ICO) split into two tranches. Proceeds from 
the first EUR 5bn tranche were to cover regional debt maturity needs in the first half 
of 2012. Six struggling regions tapped this tranche: Valencia (EUR 2.781bn), 
Catalonia (EUR 1.304bn), Andalusia (597m), Castilla-La Mancha (469m), Murcia 
(175m) and the Balearics (71m) (De la Fuente 2013a: 18). The second EUR 5bn 
tranche was designed to help repay the regions’ outstanding bills to service providers, 
though ultimately this went unused since the government created a more 
comprehensive fund for this purpose – see (2).  
2) In March 2012 the government set up a EUR 30bn (extendible to EUR 35bn) Fund for 
Financing Payments to Service Providers (Fondo para la Financiación de los Pagos a 
Proveedores, FFPP) to lend money to the regions in need to pay outstanding invoices 
to service providers and suppliers. In return, the regions would have to adhere to a 
strict adjustment programme to meet the regional deficit target set by the central 
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government, among other conditions. All fifteen regions of the common financing 
system except for Galicia used the Fund in 2012 to a total of EUR 17.104bn (with 
further funds going to the local authorities), with by far the largest amounts going to 
Valencia, Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia and Catalonia. In 2013 the regions 
subsequently tapped the FFPP for a further EUR 4.565bn.9  
3) In July 2012 the government set up an EUR 18bn Regional Liquidity Fund (Fondo de 
Liquidez Autonómica, FLA) to lend money to the regions primarily to cover debt 
maturities, with some limited funds to cover new financing needs and payments to 
suppliers too. Nine regions officially requested EUR 12.695bn from the FLA in the 
second half of 2012 according to the Spanish government at year-end (a figure it later 
updated to EUR 16.638bn in the 2014 budget presentation). Catalonia, Valencia and 
Andalusia borrowed by far the largest amounts, with smaller sums going to the 
Canaries, Castilla-La Mancha, Murcia, the Balearics, Asturias and Cantabria. In 
January 2013 the Fund was extended to help the regions into 2013 with the central 
government earmarking a further EUR 23bn to top it up, EUR 19.695bn of which was 
used.10 As with the FFPP, the regions borrowing from the Fund had to comply with a 
strict adjustment programme.  
 
           These measures were essential to enable the regions lacking alternative financing 
sources to meet their needs. Six of the regions tapped all three of the financing measures in 
2012 (the ICO line, the FFPP and the FLA), with Catalonia borrowing the second largest 
combined total (following Valencia) of nearly EUR 9bn out of over EUR 35bn across the 
fifteen regions of the common financing regime. In contrast, Extremadura, one of the poorest 
regions in terms of GDP and fiscal capacity per capita and yet one of the main beneficiaries 
of the common financing system, only required EUR 288m from the FFPP and did not tap the 
ICO line or the Regional Liquidity Fund (De la Fuente 2013a: 18). The contrast with the 
relatively healthier region of Madrid – which is more comparable to Catalonia in terms of its 
size and weight in the Spanish economy – was more striking still. Both regions started 2013 
in a very different position. Catalonia was forced to make a new plea in January for EUR 
9.073bn from the government’s Regional Liquidity Fund for the year ahead (later increased 
to EUR 9.398bn). Yet the very same month, the region of Madrid managed to issue EUR 1bn 
of 5-year bonds on the public debt markets in the largest ever single auction by a Spanish 
region to start to meet its financing needs for the year. It also managed to place a further EUR 
1bn of private placement notes with international institutional investors, among other smaller 
operations, in a sign of its continued ability to appeal to investors without needing to borrow 
from the various funds and credit lines set up by the central government.11  
            As many of the regions became reliant upon the funds set up by the central 
government and were subject to strict budgetary conditionality in return, significant progress 
in the fiscal discipline of the regions was made in 2012. The combined regional deficit at 
year-end came in at 1.76%, only 0.26% above the 1.5% target, a marked improvement on 
2011. Murcia, Valencia, the Balearics, Catalonia and Andalusia missed the target again, 
though their performance showed signs of improvement. Nevertheless, the leverage these 
measures gave the central government to exercise greater control over regional finances 
caused endless friction. The creation of the much needed Regional Liquidity Fund in mid 
July 2012 via Royal Decree Law 21/2012 of 13 July was in fact repeatedly delayed 
throughout the first half of 2012 primarily due to stalemates between the central government 
and Catalonia over the fiscal discipline the regions using the Fund would be subject to, and 
the disputes continued thereafter. At the CPFF meeting on 12 July 2012, for example, 
Spanish budget minister Cristóbal Montoro angered Catalonia and several other regions by 
announcing that they would all still be obliged to meet the 2012 regional deficit target of 
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1.5%, despite the EU’s decision to give Spain an extra year to 2014 instead of the original 
2013 target to meet the 3% target for the general government (extended in 2013 to 2016). 
Montoro warned that various regions at risk of failing to comply would be called to bilateral 
meetings with the central government to agree additional budgetary measures. This was the 
first warning contemplated under the new Budgetary Stability Law. Any region which failed 
to implement sufficient measures to ensure compliance beyond the first warning would risk 
central government intervention.  
             Power was not entirely one-sided since pressure from the regions still exercised some 
constraints on the central government’s actions. For example, it would have been politically 
very difficult for it to officially intervene in a non-compliant region that had used up all its 
warnings, as the Budgetary Stability Law foresees. Nevertheless, the Catalan government 
argued that the strict conditionality tied to the central government loans constituted a de facto 
intervention since the regions using these were only lent sufficient funds to remain compliant 
with the deficit targets and were banned from incurring additional debt from other sources. It 
maintained the Spanish government was expecting the regions to shoulder the brunt of the 
fiscal adjustment in Spain so that the central government had more room for manoeuvre. 
Other criticisms also grew from the Madrid regional government which, despite managing to 
continue to meet its financing needs of its own accord, often struggled to do so and blamed 
tough central government controls over regional debt issuances for reducing its ability to 
seize opportunities when markets conditions were propitious.  
 
Fuel for Catalan nationalist mobilization 
 
            Under these circumstances, in the first half of 2012 Artur Mas started to shift away 
from CiU’s traditional pro-autonomy stance to seek self-determination or even independence 
for Catalonia as he sought to combat the PP central government’s attempts to exercise control 
over Catalan finances and its repeated refusal to grant a fiscal pact for Catalonia. At the very 
least, the Catalan government had long wanted a revision of the equalization mechanism in 
the common financing regime to ensure that it would cease to fall in the ranking of regions in 
terms of resources per capita. To support its case, it has frequently cited the negative balance 
between what the region contributes to Spain and what it receives from the central 
government. This deficit reached EUR 16.543bn in 2010 (around 8.5% of the region’s GDP) 
according to the figures presented by the Catalan government in mid 2013, though depending 
on the method of calculation used other estimates of the Catalan deficit come closer to 5% of 
GDP (El País 2013) and none of these assume any redistribution in Spain (De la Fuente 
2013b).   
           Governing as a minority in Catalonia since its return to office in 2010, CiU hitherto 
had been dependent on alliances with the Catalan branch of the PP to approve fundamental 
economic policies, but by mid 2012 this situation had become untenable for CiU amid 
growing discontent in Catalonia towards the centralising Spanish government and its 
austerity drive. Thus when Rajoy said no again to a fiscal pact, Mas called early elections in 
November 2012 in the hope of securing a sufficient majority to avoid having to rely on PP 
support to pass the 2013 regional budget. CiU had been caught unawares by the extent of the 
independence march in Catalonia in September 2012, but Mas chose to ride the wave. The 
fight for Catalonia’s ‘right to decide’ – in other words, political sovereignty – became the key 
element of CiU’s manifesto, but CiU lost ground in the elections to the pro-independence 
party Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) and thereafter allied with the latter to secure 
its support in parliament. Rajoy agreed to consider revising the regional financing system 
again starting in 2014, but the separatist wave in Catalonia was by then continuing to grow 
regardless. The Rajoy-Mas disagreements had fed into the momentum building since 2010 in 
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particular, when the Spanish Constitutional Court had annulled enhancements to the new 
2006 Catalan statute of autonomy (see Keating and Wilson 2009, Muro 2010) previously 
approved by both the Catalan and Spanish parliaments and in a referendum in Catalonia.   
           Meanwhile, Spanish-Catalan bilateral relations were complicated further by the rise in 
inter-regional government tensions. For example, sparks flew in the first half of 2013 
between the regions which had met the 2012 deficit target and those which had not, as the 
latter – led by Catalonia – argued they ought to be given a more generous deficit allowance in 
2013 rather than all being subject to the same target. While Extremadura argued the Catalans 
should not be given a higher deficit allowance than other more fiscally compliant regions, 
Catalonia alleged it would not be in this position if it did not have to subsidize poorer regions 
like Extremadura itself via the equalization mechanism. At the same time, the Madrid 
regional government in particular made it very clear to the central government that a bilateral 
deal with Catalonia only to improve its financing position would not be acceptable.  
 
Future prospects 
             The flaws of the regional financing system combined with a chronic lack of 
transparency in regional finances have created a situation characterized by disparities in the 
treatment of different regions and smoke and mirrors, which has given politicians scope to 
propound different interpretations. Throughout the crisis, this situation often contributed to 
eroding European and international confidence in Spain and its finances. While the debate 
over the regional financing system in Catalonia has been symptom of and indeed overtaken 
by a broader clash between the Spanish and Catalan governments that is not purely economic 
in nature, the issue remains paramount and pressure for a revised system has grown from 
other parts of Spain too – especially the Madrid region, whose government made approaches 
to the Catalan government from early in 2013 to suggest they should join forces to petition 
the Spanish government for change. Yet agreeing a new reform looks set to prove more 
difficult than ever since the fight for resources has exacerbated the traditionally competitive 
dynamic among the regions. Such cross-regional competition compounds bilateral tensions, 
and political debates between the central government and opposition play out across both the 
national and regional arenas. Moreover, the anomaly whereby the Basque Country and 
Navarre do not contribute to the equalization mechanism looks likely to remain for the 
foreseeable future, not least since the PP is not in a position to further antagonise the Basque 
Nationalist Party (PNV) given that it might need its support in parliament were it to win the 
next general elections but not retain its absolute majority. Thus without a change in political 
dynamics it is hard to see how the next revision of the common financing model will be 
anything but another temporary sticking plaster that will come undone again in the near 
future. 
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Table 2: Public bond issuances to institutional investors by region, 2010-2012 
  
      
          
Date of issue Region Coupon Term (in yrs) Maturity date 
11-Feb-10 Catalonia 800 4.95% 10 11-Feb-20 
11-Feb-10 Catalonia 500 E3M* + 0.95% 3 11-Feb-13 
04-Mar-10 Balearics 200 3.61% 5 04-Mar-15 
04-Mar-10 Balearics 300 4.80% 10 04-Mar-20 
09-Mar-10 Canaries 620 4.93% 10 09-Mar-20 
12-Mar-10 Madrid 500 4.69% 10 12-Mar-20 
17-Mar-10 Andalusia 900 4.85% 10 17-Mar-20 
17-Mar-10 Valencia 400 4.90% 10 17-Mar-20 
18-Mar-10 Castilla-La Mancha 400 4.88% 10 18-Mar-10 
26-Mar-10 Galicia 500 4.81% 10 26-Mar-20 
29-Mar-10 Murcia 150 E3M + 0.88% 3 29-Mar-13 
30-Mar-10 Murcia 252 4.70% 10 30-Mar-20 
07-Apr-10 Catalonia 850 3.88% 5 07-Apr-15 
25-Jun-10 Catalonia 1,000 5.75% 5 25-Jun-15 
04-Apr-11 Catalonia 400 5.38% 2 04-Apr-13 
26-Apr-11 Valencia 400 5.50% 2 26-Apr-13 
13-May-11 Andalusia 500 5.37% 2 13-May-13 
26-Mar-12 Madrid 665 4.75% 3 26-Mar-15 
26-Mar-12 Aragón 150 4.88% 3 26-Mar-15 
30-Mar-12 Castilla y León 53 4.50% 2 31-Oct-14 
*E3M = Three-month Euribor interest rate  
    
      
Source: Based on information provided to the author by Analistas Financieros Internacionales (AFI) 
 
 
 
      
Table 3: Retail bond issuances to individual investors by region, 2010-2012 
  
      
          
Date of issue Region Coupon* Term (in yrs) Maturity date 
19-Nov-10 Catalonia 3,000 4.75% 1 21-Nov-11 
17-Dec-10 Valencia 1,500 4.75% 1 22-Dec-11 
14-Feb-11 Balearics 300 4.76% 1 15-Feb-12 
27-Apr-11 Catalonia 960 4.75% 2 27-Apr-13 
02-May-11 Catalonia 2,234 4.25% 1 02-May-12 
27-May-11 Valencia 250 4.75% 2 27-May-13 
27-May-11 Valencia 473 4.25% 1 27-May-12 
05-Oct-11 Andalusia 600 4.25% 1 05-Oct-12 
21-Nov-11 Catalonia 2,639 4.75% 1 21-Nov-12 
21-Nov-11 Catalonia 1,581 5.25% 2 21-Nov-13 
21-Dec-11 Murcia 150 4.75% 1 21-Dec-12 
21-Dec-11 Murcia 67 5.50% 2 21-Dec-13 
22-Dec-11 Valencia 895 5.00% 1 21-Dec-12 
22-Dec-11 Valencia 163 5.50% 2 20-Dec-13 
15-Feb-12 Balearics 75 5.00% 1 18-Jan-13 
15-Feb-12 Balearics 200 5.50% 2 14-Feb-14 
21-Mar-12 Andalusia 369 5.00% 1 21-Mar-13 
21-Mar-12 Andalusia 145 5.50% 2 21-Mar-14 
29-Apr-12 Catalonia 1,531 4.50% 1 29-Apr-13 
29-Apr-12 Catalonia 782 5.00% 2 29-Apr-14 
09-May-12 Murcia 117 5.00% 1 09-May-13 
09-May-12 Murcia 53 5.50% 2 09-May-14 
*Note that the regions had to pay expensive bank fees of around 3% on top of the coupon rates for these retail bonds 
 
      
Source: Based on information provided to the author by Analistas Financieros Internacionales (AFI) 
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Notes 
                                                            
1 At the time of writing, Prime Minister Rajoy has indicated that the revision of the common 
financing regime will start after attention has been focused in 2014 on the reform of Spain’s 
tax system.  
2 Further complexity results from the fact that within the common regime the Canary Islands 
have a specific economic and tax system.  
3 The annual liquidation statements for the common financing regime are published by the 
Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas. Available here: 
http://www.minhap.gob.es/es-
ES/Estadistica%20e%20Informes/Estadisticas%20territoriales/Paginas/Informes%20financia
cion%20comunidades%20autonomas2.aspx  
4 Spain’s public sector debt figures measured according to the Excessive Deficit Principle are 
published by the Bank of Spain. Available here: 
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/htmls/cdp.html (figures cited as accessed on 8 
February 2014) 
5 The following sections are informed by numerous articles in the Spanish press (especially 
El País and Expansión) and official government releases, as well as the many conversations 
and interviews on the subject of regional finances the author held with relevant experts in 
both government and the private sector over the period 2010 to 2013. 
6 Note that although the debt issued by Spain’s regional governments had not been explicitly 
guaranteed by the Spanish government, the widespread view was the central government 
could not let a region default. Concerns about regional finances therefore negatively impacted 
Spanish bond yields throughout the crisis. In this regard, Spain fits the model propounded by 
Rodden (2006) whereby expectations that central governments will assume responsibility for 
bailing out their subnational governments are strongest in the countries where the latter rely 
on revenue sharing and transfers rather than just independent local taxation. 
7 Spain still just managed to meet its overall 9.3% deficit target for general government in 
2010 due to strong fiscal readjustment by the central government. Here and elsewhere in the 
article, I give the official deficit figures announced by the Spanish government in March 
following the year in question (which exclude repayments owed following the liquidation of 
the regional financing system for prior years). Note, however, that these have often been 
subject to further modification at later dates, for example following revisions to GDP figures. 
8 My thanks to Madrid-based consulting firm Analistas Financieros Internacionales (AFI) for 
providing these figures on the financing secured by the regions in 2010 and 2011. For more 
information on the evolution of regional debt and financing options during the crisis, see 
Goikoetxea and Cantalapiedra 2011.  
9 According to provisional figures provided by the Spanish government in its 2014 budget 
presentation on 3 October 2013. 
10 As per note 9. 
11 Madrid did choose to tap the FFPP for EUR 1.257bn in 2012 (De la Fuente 2013a: 18) but 
this Fund was not viewed as an embarrassing central government ‘bailout’ in the same way as 
the Regional Liquidity Fund. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
